We know that the constitution says we all have a right to not be required to incriminate ourselves: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In some cases, the meaning of that right, and the line-in-sand it draws, are evident enough. In other cases, not so much.
Consider the appeal (formally, a request for writ of certiorari) of the Idaho Attorney General's office, filed Friday, to the U.S. Supreme Court, from a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Here's the executive summary:
After his conviction and sentence for rape, Krispen Estrada filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Idaho district court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in sentencing. The district court determined that Estrada’s counsel in the criminal case had provided deficient performance by failing to advise Estrada about his privilege against self-incrimination in regard to a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation. The court denied the claim, however, reasoning that Estrada was not prejudiced because he would have received the same sentence because the sentencing court could have properly drawn adverse inferences at sentencing, such as lack of remorse, non-amenability to treatment, and risk to the community, if Estrada had refused to participate in the evaluation. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s finding of lack of prejudice, implicitly rejecting the district court’s determination that the sentencing court may properly draw adverse inferences from silence at sentencing, and holding prejudice was shown because the evaluation “played a role” in sentencing. The question presented is:
Other than in finding the facts and circumstances of the offense, may a sentencing court draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s refusal to cooperate in a pre- sentencing evaluation?
Estrada's offense is certainly heinous, "beating, choking and raping his estranged wife in front of their children," then holding off police in a seven-hour armed confrontation. But the question of self-incrimination - in this case, allowing an effective inference of guilt from a decision not to speak - is a lot broader than one case.